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Employment Protection and Innovation Intensity  
1. Introduction  
This paper examines the relationship between the strictness of employment protection legislation 
(EPL) and innovation performance. This question is interesting and relevant for both research and 
policy. Modern economic theory has identified innovation as a major driver of economic growth.1 
While there is a well established literature on the effects of institutions on economic growth2 there 
is little evidence about the effect of labour market institutions and labour market reforms on 
innovation. From a policy perspective, innovation is particularly important for sustainable economic 
growth and for maintaining high living standards in developed economies in the context of increased 
global competition from low-wage countries. Our analysis provides empirical evidence to inform 
policy design on the role of labour market institutions and labour market reforms on innovation 
performance.  
Theoretical predictions on the effects of labour market institutions, such as employment protection 
legislation, on innovation are ambiguous. On the one hand, strong employment protection increases 
job security and incentivises employees to invest in firm-specific human capital and to engage in 
innovation activities. On the other hand, high hiring and firing costs increase the adjustment cost 
firms face when they need to adjust to idiosyncratic shocks and thus, they discourage firms from 
innovating. Which effect dominates in reality is a matter of empirical analysis.   
Existing empirical evidence on the effects of labour market institutions and labour market reforms 
on innovation is not clear-cut. Acarya et al (2010) used country-industry data for the United States 
(US), United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany and India as well as within-US data and found that 
stronger dismissal laws had a positive impact on innovation intensity at the industry level and that 
they led to relatively more innovation in the innovation-intensive industries than in traditional 
industries. Barbosa and Faria (2011), using country-industry data for European Union countries, 
found that stricter employment protection legislation led to less innovation intensity at the industry 
level.  Griffith and Macartney (2010) used data on the location of innovative activity by multinational 
firms across twelve OECD countries and found that, while multinational firms located more 
innovative activity in countries with high EPL, they located more radical (technologically advanced) 
innovation activity in countries with low EPL.        
The main challenge in the analysis of the effect of country level employment protection on 
innovation performance is to identify a causal link in the presence of many confounding factors, 
many of them unobservable. To address this identification issue, we improve on these previous 
contributions in two ways. First, we use a panel of country-industry data and estimate difference-in-
difference models to account for the fact that EPL may be more relevant in industries with a higher 
layoff propensity, where EPL is likely to be more binding. Thus, we control for all unobserved country 
                                                          
1  See for example Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1997), Acemoglu et al. (2006). 
2  An excellent review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of institutions on long-run growth is 
provided by Acemoglu et al. (2005).   
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and industry characteristics that are unlikely to have on average different effects on innovation 
intensity between industries with high layoff propensities and the other industries, including 
institutions which do not affect directly industry layoff propensity. Second, in contrast to previous 
studies, we consider three EPL indicators to distinguish between overall EPL, EPL for regular 
contracts, and EPL for temporary contracts.  
Our estimates indicate that stricter employment protection legislation led to significantly lower 
innovation intensity in industries with a higher job reallocation propensity. Further, we find that the 
strictness of employment regulations on the use of temporary contracts had a stronger impact on 
innovation intensity than the strictness of employment protection for regular contracts. Our findings 
are robust to additional industry covariates and to other labour market institutions that may affect 
innovation performance and industry job reallocation propensity. Innovation intensity was 
significantly higher in industries with a higher import competition and in industries with less strict 
product market regulations. We find that the generosity of unemployment benefit systems led to 
lower innovation intensity in industries with a higher job reallocation propensity, while higher co-
ordination and higher centralisation of wage setting led to higher innovation intensity in the same 
group of industries. It appears that a decrease in the gross unemployment benefit led to higher 
innovation intensity in industries with a higher job reallocation propensity. In addition, our 
sensitivity analysis indicates that our results are not driven by the particular measures of 
employment protection legislation and industry layoff propensity that we use or by any country in 
our sample.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses some stylized facts on the 
relationship between the strictness of employment protection legislation and innovation intensity in 
OECD countries. Section 3 presents the theoretical and empirical background of our analysis.  We 
discuss our empirical strategy and model specifications in Section 4. Section 5 describes the data 
that we use. Section 6 discusses the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.   
 
2. Stylized Facts  
In this Section we discuss some stylized facts on the relationship between the strictness of 
employment protection legislation (EPL) and innovation intensity in OECD countries.3  
We start with a summary of patterns and trends of EPL. We use three OECD indicators on the 
strictness of EPL4 as follows: a composite index (EPL) measuring the strictness of regulation and 
dismissal for regular and temporary contracts; a sub-indicator measuring the strictness of dismissal 
of employees on regular contracts (EPLR) and a sub-indicator measuring the strictness of regulation 
on the use of temporary contracts (EPLT). These measures evaluate the strictness of employment 
protection on a scale of 0 to 6 with higher values indicating stricter employment protection.  
                                                          
3  For a more detailed descriptive analysis of the link between EPL and innovation intensity see Koster et al. (2011). 
4  The data is available from www.oecd.org/employment/protection. The latest updated estimates of the OECD 
indicators on employment protection legislation and methodology are discussed in Venn (2009). 
4 
Table 1 shows the averages and changes in EPL in OECD countries over the period 1985-2008. There 
is a large variation between the countries for which we have data available. The United States, the 
United Kingdom and Canada had the least strict EPL whereas Greece, Portugal and Turkey had the 
strictest EPL. Futhermore, EPL has decreased in many countries over time with the exception of 
France whereas some of the countries with the least strict EPL have experienced increases in EPL 
strictness albeit much smaller in magnitude.  
[Table 1 here] 
While the averages give insight into the level of EPL over time, the change in EPL measured as the 
difference between the final year (2008) and the initial year (1985) show where reform has been the 
greatest. In Figure 1, we can see that observations in the right hand side of the forty five degree line 
are the most prevalent  indicating decreases in EPL. The observations along the forty five degree line 
show no change in EPL over time whereas there are some instances of small increases in EPL in the 
left hand side of the forty five degree line. Breaking this down into EPLR and EPLT in Figures 2 and 3, 
respectively, reveals little change in EPLR with most observations on or near the forty five degree 
line. However, EPLT shows substantial decreases in employment protection strictness. This 
demonstrates that labour market reforms have occured largely in temporary rather than regular 
contracts. 
[Figures 1-3 about here] 
We discuss next patterns and trends in industry innovation intensity in OECD countries. We proxy 
industry innovation intensity with the number of patents per hour worked by employees.  The data 
source is the EU KLEMS Database.5 Patents have been widely used as an innovation indicator 
although they measure invention rather than innovation (Griliches, 1990). In addition, the use of 
patents to protect inventions varies across industries (Kortum and Lerner, 1999). Alternative 
measures that have been used include R&D expenditure intensity and innovation outcomes from 
enterprise survey data. While the first measure is an innovation input, data for the second 
innovation measure is available for a limited number of countries (European countries only) and for 
a limited number of time points.6    
Table 2 shows the average patent intensity and the change in patent intensity over the period 1989-
1999 in OECD countries.  The United States had the highest average patent intensity, substantially 
above the next highest performing countries (Japan, Sweden and Finland) while Portugal, Greece 
and Spain show the lowest average patent intensity. Those countries with the greatest change in 
patent intensity (Korea, Greece and Denmark) have low to medium average patent intensity 
whereas the countries with the smallest change in patent intensity (Netherlands, Spain and Ireland) 
had both low and high average patent intensity. As such, changes in patent intensity vary widely 
                                                          
5  These data are available from http://www.euklems.net/. The patent counts are based on patents granted by the 
USPTO until 2002 available from the NBER Database published by Hall et al. (2001). Details about the methodology and 
the assignment of patents by country, industry and year are given in O’ Mahony et al. (2008).  
6  Innovation outcomes aggregated from Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) are available from the EUROSTAT for 
European Union countries for two time points: 2002-2004 and 2004-2006. While we have considered using these 
broader measures of innovation, these data limitations do not allow us to improve our analysis.     
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even across countries with different average patent intensity levels. Figure 4 illustrates this variation 
across countries in the innovation intensity changes over the period 1989-1999.  
[Table 2 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Finally, Figures 5-7 summarize the relationship between EPL and innovation intensity at the country 
level. Figure 5 illustrates a negative relationship between average EPL and average innovation 
intensity (the Pearson correlation coefficient is - 0.52). Countries with stricter average EPL such as 
Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal are associated with very low average innovation intensity. 
Nevertheless, the converse does not hold with countries such as the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Australia showing low average innovation intensity despite low average EPL although the United 
States had both the lowest average EPL and the highest innovation intensity. Hence, additional 
factors are likely to influence the relationship between EPL and innovation intensity. It is also 
noteworthy that some of the countries with the highest average innovation intensity - Japan, Finland 
and Sweden – had moderately strict EPL.  
[Figures 5-7 about here] 
Figures 6 and 7 show that average EPLR and EPLT are negatively related innovation intensity (the 
related Pearson correlation coefficients are -0.46 and -0.45, respectively). Again, it appears that 
these relationships are conditioned by other factors which we discuss in the next Section.  
 
3. Theoretical and Empirical Framework  
In theory, there are two channels through which employment protection legislation (EPL) impacts on 
innovation. The first channel is human capital investment documented by the literature of efficiency        
wages. Existing theoretical contributions suggest that increased job security due to employment 
protection increases the propensity of employees to invest in firm-specific and industry-specific 
human capital and to engage in innovative activity (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Acemoglu, 1997; 
Akerloff, 1999; Belot et al., 2007). Recent empirical evidence indicates that in countries with stricter 
EPL, employees invest more in firm-specific and industry-specific skills instead of portable general 
skills (Estevez-Abe et al 2001). Further, stricter employment legislation increases employees’ 
bargaining power and their incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital. Tang (2012) shows 
that countries with stricter EPL specialise in industries where firm-specific skills are more important.  
Wasmer (2006) shows that stricter EPL raises the relative returns to specific skills in equilibrium due 
to the fact that higher firing costs increase labour market frictions and the average duration of 
employment. Acarya et al (2010) found that stronger dismissal laws in the US had a positive impact 
on innovation intensity at the industry level and that they led to relatively more innovation in the 
innovation-intensive industries than in traditional industries. However, Barbosa and Faria (2011) 
found that stricter EPL led to less innovation intensity at the industry level in EU countries.     
The second channel through which EPL impacts on innovation is adjustment costs faced by firms 
when they need to adjust to idiosyncratic shocks. High hiring and firing costs may lead to under-
investment in innovative activities that require adjustment, in particular in technologically advanced 
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industries (Saint-Paul, 1997; 2002; Samaniego, 2006; Cuñat and Melitz, 2010). Stricter layoff 
regulations discourage firms from experimenting with new technologies with higher returns but also 
with higher volatility (Bartelsman et al., 2010). Firing restrictions are more costly in industries with 
rapid technological change such as information and communication technologies (ICT) which implies 
that countries with stricter EPL tend to specialise in industries with a low rate of technical change 
(Samaniego, 2006). Koeniger (2005) finds that dismissal costs are negatively associated with R&D 
intensity across countries and positively linked to R&D intensity within countries over time. Further, 
he demonstrates theoretically that while stricter layoff regulations foster innovation of incumbent 
firms they deter the entry of innovative firms.  
Pierre and Scarpetta (2006) find evidence showing that innovative firms are the most negatively 
affected by stricter EPL. Bartelsman et al. (2010) find that high-risk innovative sectors are relatively 
smaller in countries with stricter EPL. Theoretical models on labour market regulations and 
international specialisation (Saint-Paul, 1997; 2002) suggest that countries with stricter EPL 
specialise in incremental innovation while new products are first produced in countries with low EPL. 
It follows that high firing costs lead to a lower number of new products in the world economy with 
negative welfare implications if efficiency improvements from incremental innovation are not large 
enough.  In addition, recent theoretical contributions (Cuñat and Melitz, 2007; 2010) suggests that 
given the relationship between EPL and firms’ adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks, countries with 
more flexible labour markets specialise in more volatile industries.  
Another strand of empirical literature has found that stable and more co-operative relationships 
between employees and employers support incremental innovation while more flexible labour 
markets support more radical innovation (Soskice, 1997; Hall and Soskice, 2001).   
Griffith and Macartney (2010) analysed the effect of EPL on innovation by multinational firms. They 
distinguish between incremental and radical innovation. Their theoretical model suggests that while 
EPL is negatively related to the optimal level of investment in radical innovation, it is positively linked 
to the optimal level of investment in incremental innovation. Using data on the location of 
innovative activity by multinational firms across twelve OECD countries they find that while 
multinational firms locate more innovative activity in countries with high EPL, they locate more 
radical (technologically advanced) innovation activity in countries with low EPL.       
Another strand of relevant literature focuses on the effects of competition on innovation. The 
theoretical predictions about the effects of competition on the incentives of firms to innovate are 
ambiguous. On the one hand, competition may incentivise firms to innovate in order to protect or 
enhance their market position (“escape-competition” effect).7 On the other hand, competition may 
reduce the returns to innovation or entry and thus reduce the incentives of firms to innovate 
(“Schumpeterian effect”).8   
Recent theoretical and empirical contributions models bring these two effects together (Aghion et 
al. 1999, 2001, 2005, 2009). In industries closer to the technology frontier (“neck-and-neck 
industries”) the “escape-competition” effect is stronger and increased competition leads to more 
                                                          
7  Aghion et al. (2001, 2005). 
8  Grossman and Helpman (1991),  Aghion and Howitt (1992). 
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innovation, while in the laggard industries, the “Schumpeterian effect” prevails. In this latter case, 
increased competition reduces the incentives of firms to innovate. The outcome of these 
contributions suggests that both effects are at work. The overall aggregate effect of increased 
competition depends on the initial level of competition and the industry composition with respect to 
the distance to the technology frontier.   
The relationship between competition and innovation is an inverted U-shaped one illustrating the 
presence of an escape competition effect versus a Schumpeterian effect (Aghion and Griffith, 2005). 
The escape competition effect is more likely at low initial levels of competition whereas the 
Schumpeterian effect tends to dominate at higher levels of competition.   
Aghion et al. (2005) find that competition discourages laggard firms from innovating but encourages 
neck-and-neck firms to innovate. Griffith et al. (2010) show that the EU Single Market Programme 
was associated with increased product market competition and subsequently with a higher  
innovation intensity and productivity growth in the manufacturing sectors.    
The effect of EPL on innovation may depend on other labour market institutions regulating wage 
rigidity and redistributive patterns (Belot et al., 2007). Haucap and Wey (2004) analysed the effects 
of wage bargaining regimes on innovation and found that firms’ incentives to innovate were largest 
under centralised wage setting and smallest under co-ordinated wage setting. Bassanini and Ernst 
(2002) find that, in countries with co-ordinated wage setting, R&D expenditure intensity was 
negatively correlated with labour market flexibility for high-tech industries. Another strand of 
literature has focused on the relationship between unions and innovation. A number of studies 
suggest that firms that face strong unions have a higher incentive to innovate than firms that face 
weaker unions (Tauman and Weiss, 1987; Ulph and Ulph, 1994, 1998, 2001). Menezes-Filho et al 
(1998) found a positive link between union density and a firm’s relative R&D performance. However, 
when union density was very high, the effects of the union power on R&D performance turned 
negative.    
While most of existing literature has focused on EPL for regular contracts, recent contributions have 
also analysed the effects of the use of temporary contracts on firm productivity. An empirical 
established fact is that employees with temporary contracts participate less in firm-specific training 
than permanent employees (Arulampalam and Booth, 1998; Albert et al., 2005; Bassanini et al., 
2007; Fouarge et al., 2012; Martin and Scarpetta, 2012). In theory, the use of temporary contracts 
could have both positive and negative effects on firm productivity. On the one hand, the use of 
temporary contracts could increase firm productivity via increased flexibility, while the lower firm-
specific human capital could impact negatively firm productivity (Hirsh and Mueller 2012).  Existing 
empirical evidence on the effects of using temporary contracts on firm productivity is mixed. While  
a number of studies find positive but insignificant effects of the temporary contracts use on firm 
productivity (Arvanitis 2005; Bassanini et al. 2009), Hirsch and Mueller (2012) find evidence that the 
relationship between temporary contracts use and firm productivity is an inverted U-shaped one. 
Cappellari et al. (2012) examined the effects of reforming temporary contracts use on firm 
productivity in Italy. They find that the reform of apprenticeship contracts increased productivity 
while the liberalisation of the use of fixed contracts lowered firm productivity. Jahn et al. (2012) 
suggest that there might be a trade-off between efficiency and equity effects of labour market 
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deregulation. They show that stricter EPL is associated positively with labour productivity and 
negatively with an equal income distribution.       
In summary, existing theoretical and empirical contributions suggest that the relationship between 
EPL and innovation could be both positive and negative. Furthermore, it appears that the effects of 
EPL on innovation are conditioned by industry and country characteristics such as layoff propensity, 
technology intensity, skills intensity, competition pressures, openness, and other labour market 
institutions such as wage setting institutions.  
 
4. Empirical Methodology  
Our review of existing theoretical and empirical literature suggests that the effect of EPL on 
innovation will differ across countries and between industries within countries. Bassanini et al. 
(2009) use a difference-in-differences empirical methodology and show that the effect of EPL on 
productivity growth is larger in industries where dismissal regulations are more binding. We build on 
this approach9 and assume that the effect of EPL on innovation will be larger in industries with a 
higher layoff propensity, where EPL is likely to be more binding. These industries are industries with 
a relatively high propensity to adjust their human resources through layoffs due to industry-specific 
technological and market-driven factors. In the rest of industries where firms restructure through 
internal restructuring or by natural attrition of staff, we expect that EPL will have a lower or little 
impact on the incentive to innovate.  
To identify the effects of EPL on innovation intensity we adopt a difference-in-differences empirical 
approach similar to Bassanini et al. (2009) and explain the variation of innovation intensity within 
countries between industries with high layoff propensities (EPL-binding industries) and the rest of 
industries as a function of the EPL level and changes in EPL.10 The basic identification assumption of 
this empirical approach is that the effect of EPL on innovation intensity will be greater in industries 
with higher layoff propensities. The advantage of this approach is that we can control for all 
unobserved country and industry characteristics that may affect innovation intensity but are unlikely 
to have on average different effects on innovation intensity between industries with high layoff 
propensities and the other industries, including institutions which do not affect directly industry 
layoff propensities.    
Baseline Model Specification  
The simplest model specification relates the innovation intensity at industry level to country EPL and 
EPL change as follows: 
ijtjtititjitjijt EPLLEPLLINNO εµλβα +++∆+= −1ln                                  (1)        
                                                          
9  Rajan and Zingales (1998) have proposed this econometric framework in their analysis of the role of financial 
development on economic growth. Murphy and Siedschlag (2011) used a similar empirical approach to analyse the role 
of human capital on economic growth.  
10  The effect of the level of EPL on innovation may be conditioned by the change in EPL.  
9 
The dependent variable, ijtINNO , is a measure of innovation intensity in country i, industry j, at time 
t. jL  is a measure of layoff propensity in industry j. 1−itEPL  is an indicator of the strictness of 
employment protection in country i lagged one year to alleviate concerns about possible 
endogeneity.  itEPL∆  is the first-difference change in EPL in country i.  itλ  controls for unobserved 
country-time effects,11 while jtµ  controls for unobserved industry-time effects that may affect 
innovation intensity and have no direct effect on industry layoff propensity.  ijtε  is an idiosyncratic 
error term.  
The parameters of interest to be estimated are α and β. α can be interpreted as the long-run effect 
of EPL on innovation intensity, while β captures its short-run effect. α > 0 (β > 0) implies that in 
countries with stricter EPL (increased EPL strictness), innovation intensity is higher in industries with 
high layoff propensities than in the rest of industries. This result would suggest that EPL impacts on 
innovation intensity mainly via the human capital investment channel. Alternatively, α< 0 (β < 0) 
would indicate that in countries with stricter EPL (increased EPL strictness), innovation intensity in 
industries with high layoff propensities is lower than in the rest of industries. This result would 
suggest that the adjustment cost effect of EPL on innovation intensity dominates.      
Econometric Issues 
Innovation intensity at the industry level may be driven by other industry and country characteristics 
that may have a differential effect on innovation intensity in industries with high layoff propensities 
and the rest of industries. To account for these effects, we augment Equation (1) with other country-
industry covariates, jiYX :  
ijtjtittjtiitjitjijt YXEPLIEPLIINNO εµλγβα ++++∆+= −−− 1,1,1ln        (2)  
Following on the literature review discussed in Section 3, we account for potential effects of industry 
specialisation (capital intensity, skills intensity), technology intensity (the distance to the technology 
frontier), international competition pressures (import penetration), industry competition (product 
market regulations).  
In addition, we control for the effect of other country-level labour market institutions that might  
condition the effect of EPL on innovation intensity.   
We estimate models (1) and (2) with the three EPL indicators discussed in Section 2: the overall 
composite indicator on the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL), the indicator on 
the strictness of the employment protection legislation on regular contracts (EPLR), and the 
indicator of the strictness of employment protection legislation on temporary contracts (EPLT).    
Detailed definitions of variables and data sources are given in Table A1 in the Appendix.    
                                                          
11 λit  controls also for the average country level and change effects of employment protection legislation on innovation 
intensity.  
10 
5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Country-Industry Data 
The country-industry data used in our analysis are mainly taken from the EU KLEMS database.12 The 
EU KLEMS data are based on the ISIC Rev. 3 classification and the baseline level of aggregation in the 
database is between one and two digits. Variables included in the database include nominal gross 
output, value added, industry price deflators, number of employees, number of hours worked by 
employees, share of hours worked by high, median and low skilled employees, nominal and real 
fixed assets. Data are available for EU countries along with data for the US, Canada, Japan, South 
Korea, Australia, Norway. Time coverage of the data varies by country with data reported for the 
period 1970 to 2007 in the best cases and for the period 1995 to 2007 for new EU Member States. 
The patents data are taken from the EU KLEMS Linked Data 2008 Release with data reported for the 
period 1970 to 1999.13  
Innovation Intensity (INNO), the dependant variable that we use in this paper is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of total patents to total hours worked by employees (millions) in each 
country-industry grouping in each period.14  The Distance to the Technology Frontier (dtf) is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the industry’s labour productivity (i.e. gross value added to 
total hours worked by employees) divided by labour productivity in the country-industry group with 
the highest labour productivity in each year (i.e. technology frontier). We use data on nominal gross 
output, exports and imports from the OECD STAN Database for Structural Analysis to construct an 
Import Competition (impcomp) measure which is calculated as the ratio of total imports divided by 
the sum of gross output minus exports plus imports for each year in each industry.15 We account for 
the potential direct and indirect costs of market entry regulation in highly regulated industries on 
manufacturing sectors of the economy by including an industry measure of the potential costs of 
anti-competitive regulation, Product Market Regulations (pmr). These data are taken from Nickell 
(2006).   
Industry-Level Data 
We proxy the layoff propensity in industry j in period t with the Job Reallocation Rate ( jtjr ) defined 
following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992):  
∑
−
+
= t
t
jt
jtjt
jt
emp
jcrjdes
jr
1
2
1
           (3) 
                                                          
12 The EU KLEMS database provides data on measures of economic growth, productivity, employment creation, capital 
formation and technological change at the industry level for all European Union Member States from 1970 onwards. 
More information is available at http://www.euklems.net. 
13  For description see O’Mahony et al (2008). 
14 Two measures of patents are provided in the database. We use the fractional based patents measure which means that 
if a patent is assigned k codes, it counts 1/k for each industry. To avoid losing observations which are equal to zero, we 
add one to the obtained innovation intensity before we take the natural logarithm of this variable. 
15  For a number of countries, production data is only available from 1990 onwards. Export and import data is available for 
South Korea from 1994 onwards. 
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where jtjdes  represents the total number of jobs terminated in industry j in period t, jtjcrt
denotes jobs created in industry t in period t. The denominator is the average employment over the 
period t-1 and t in t industry j. Data on industry-level job flows are taken from the EU KLEMS 
database. These job flow variables were constructed using firm-level data from the AMADEUS 
dataset from Bureau Van Djik. Coverage of these variables is available from 1990 to 2004 for 28 
industries. 
We use US data to proxy for an industry’s intrinsic job reallocation propensity.16 The underlying 
motivation for this approach is that job reallocation rates from other more rigid labour markets are 
likely to be correlated with the country’s level of EPL and this could result in biased estimates of the 
impact of EPL on patent intensity, (for a related discussion see Cingano et al. 2010). Therefore, it is 
important that each industry’s intrinsic job reallocation requirements are correctly measured in 
order to ensure that the estimate of the effect of EPL is unbiased. The US job reallocation rates are 
used as the US has the lowest EPL value and is one of the most flexible labour markets in the world 
(see Table 1).  
Bassanini et al. (2009) use US layoff rates in their analysis of the differential effects of EPL on 
industry labour productivity growth. They contend that EPL primarily relates to dismissal regulations, 
therefore layoff rates are a more appropriate variable to characterise each industry’s intrinsic labour 
adjustment rate. However, one can argue strongly that stricter EPL increases the cost of dismissal 
workers and should in turn influence firm’s job creation rate. Therefore, we focus on job reallocation 
rates as our proxy for an industry’s intrinsic labour adjustment rate.17 
The methodological approach we take in this paper is based on the assumption that our choice of 
country-industry benchmark is an appropriate approximation of the industry job reallocation across 
all countries. To support this assumption, we undertake a number of robustness checks. First, we 
examine the distribution of US job reallocation rates over time. If the industry job reallocation rates 
were not stable over time, they would not be very informative in identifying those industries which 
are more likely to be affected by EPL. To check the stability of industry job reallocation rates over the 
analysed period, we calculate the Spearman rank correlations for pairs of two periods between 1990 
and 2003. The results are presented in Table 3. The correlations suggest that the industry 
distribution of US job reallocation rates remained stable over the analysed period. For example, the 
Spearman correlation between job reallocation rates in 1990-1991 and in 2002-2003 is very high 
with a value of 0.83. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Second, it is possible that US specific institutional characteristics may influence US job reallocation 
rates. Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) show that biased estimates of the interaction of interest can 
occur due to mis-measurement of the intrinsic industry benchmark arising from idiosyncratic shocks 
and other influences. Third, as discussed in Cingano et al. (2010), this benchmark approach is 
                                                          
16  A number of recent studies have followed this approach (Cingano et al., 2010; Bassanini et al., 2009; Micco and Pages, 
2006). 
17  In our sensitivity analysis, we use the US industry layoff rates taken from Bassanini et al. (2009). This variable is only 
available for the period 2001 to 2003. 
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appropriate only if the intrinsic job reallocation rate is similar for each of the sub-industries included 
in an industry grouping, or that the average of sub-industry components in each of the aggregate 
industry classifications are similar, across countries. One way to address these issues is to use an 
alternative benchmark measure. In our sensitivity analysis, we re-estimate the model using US 
industry layoff rates. This variable is taken from Bassanini et al. (2009) and is defined as the 
percentage ratio between annual recorded layoffs and wage and salary employment in that year in 
each US industry.  
Table 4 shows averages for industry characteristics that we use in our analysis. When we combine 
the industry job reallocation rates with the patents intensity variable, we have eleven industries  
across which data is available for both variables.18 We exclude from our analysis Coke, Refined 
Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel due to measurement issues for a number of variables (i.e. 
cases of negative value added values observations) and limited data coverage for other variables. 
The panel data sample begins in 1990 as this is the first period for which job reallocation rate data is 
available. The patents data is available up to 1999 which determines the end of our panel dataset.19  
[Table 4 about here] 
To account for potential effects of industry specialisation on innovation intensity we use a number of 
additional industry-level variables. We include a measure of Physical Capital Intensity which is equal 
to the US industry capital stock divided by output averaged over the period 1985 to 2007. To control 
for an industry’s Human Capital Intensity, we include the average share of US high and medium 
skilled employees over the period 1985 to 2007.  
Country-Level Data 
We use three measures of EPL taken from the OECD Indicators of Employment Protection database. 
The three measures used in this paper are (i) a composite index measuring the strictness of 
regulation and dismissal for regular and temporary contracts, EPL; (ii) an indicator measuring the 
protection of workers against individual dismissal on regular contracts, EPLR. Some of the main 
factors that this index attempts to quantify include regulation dealing with notification procedures, 
severance pay entitlements and the grounds for unfair dismissals. (iii) an indicator measuring  the 
strictness of regulation on the use temporary forms of employment (EPLT). This index takes into 
account regulation which addresses the maximum number and length of temporary contract 
renewals allowed, as well as conditions under which temporary and fixed contracts can be offered. 
These measures evaluate the strictness of employment protection on a scale of 0 to 6. A higher 
value indicates stricter employment protection. The dataset contains information for 30 OECD 
countries and 10 non-OECD countries. The start date of the data coverage varies across countries 
                                                          
18  Patents data was available at more a disaggregated level for a number of industries. We combine the patents data in 
these industries to match the more aggregated industry classification for which the job reallocation rate variable is 
available for. 
19  The list of countries included in our sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom. Due to limited data for a 
number of variables, Korea and Ireland are excluded from the model specification which includes additional covariates.  
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with data available from 1985 to 2008 in the best cases. In our analysis we use each of the EPL 
indices and their respective annual logarithmic growth rates.  
Other country-level controls used in the analysis include union density, the average tax wedge, the 
average gross unemployment benefit,  a measure of net unemployment benefit, an index which 
measures the degree of coordination in the wage bargaining process, an index of wage bargaining 
centralization, and expenditure on active labour market policies as a percentage of GDP.  The 
description of these variables and data sources are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
Table A2 in the Appendix shows summary statistics of the main explanatory variables.   
 
6. Empirical Results 
Table 5 reports the estimates obtained from our baseline difference-in-differences model described 
by Eq. (1). Our econometric model estimates the effect of EPL on innovation intensity between 
industries with high job-reallocation rates (EPL-binding) and the other industries. The dependent 
variable is the number of patents granted at industry level per total hours worked in the industry. 
The explanatory variables include the EPL interacted with industry job reallocation rates (𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗
𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1), the change in EPL interacted with industry job reallocation rates, (𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡), along 
with country-time and industry-time dummies. We estimate the model for three employment 
protection measures: the aggregate EPL index and the two sub indices EPLR and EPLT. The results in 
column 1 suggest that in countries with stricter EPL, industries with high job reallocation rates had 
lower innovation intensity. This result is consistent with findings in the literature which suggests that 
high firing costs due to stringent EPL discourage investment in innovative activities that require 
adjustment (e.g. Saint-Paul, 1997; Bartelsman et al., 2004). Comparing the effect of EPL for regular 
and temporary contracts on innovation, we find that the effect is negative and significant for the EPL 
of temporary contracts, while the effect of EPL for regular contracts appears negative but not 
significant. Column 4 shows the estimates when both EPLR and EPLT are included in the same model. 
We continue to find that stricter regulation on temporary contracts had a negative effect on 
innovation intensity while the effect of EPLR is negative but not significant. The use of temporary 
employment has become an increasingly important channel of adjustment for firms. Our results 
suggests that the strictness of regulations on the use of temporary contracts which limit a firm’s 
ability to respond to shifts in demand for products and to changes in technology discourages firms 
from innovating. The effect of the strictness of regulations on the use of temporary contracts on 
innovation intensity appears to be the main driver of the effect of the overall EPL on innovation 
intensity.  
[Table 5 about here] 
We find that changes in each of the EPL measures had no significant effect on industry innovation 
performance. This suggests that annual changes in EPL had no immediate impact on firms’ 
innovation intensity. This is perhaps unsurprising as it is likely to take time for firms to restructure 
their human resources in response to EPL changes. Given the short time period over which our 
analysis is conducted we cannot estimate precisely the delay with which changes in EPL impact on 
innovation intensity. 
14 
To assess the economic importance of the statistically significant effect of the EPL on industry 
innovation performance, we calculate the effect of an increase in EPL from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile level on the innovation intensity differential between industries located at the 25th and 
75th percentile levels of job reallocation rates. Based on the estimates in Table 5 column 1, the 
implied innovation intensity differential between the industry at the 25th percentile with respect to 
the job reallocation rate (i.e. Chemicals and Chemical Products) and the industry at the 75th 
percentile (i.e. Electrical and Optical Equipment) is 1.7 percentage points in a country with EPL at the 
25th percentile (i.e. Japan) compared with a country at the 75th percentile (i.e. France).   
Next, we estimate the augmented model described by Eq. 2 which includes additional industry-level 
covariates that may affect industry innovation intensity as well as job reallocation rates.  Specifically, 
we control for the distance to the technology frontier (dtf), import competition (impcomp), and the 
strictness of product market regulations (pmr). In addition, we include other country-industry 
interactions which could potentially affect differences in innovation intensity between the industries 
with high job reallocation rates and the other industries. For example, differences in country-
industry specialisation may affect differently industry innovation intensity (see for example Griffith 
and Macartney 2010). We account for the role that a country’s physical capital abundance may have 
on industry innovation by interacting each country’s physical capital ratio with the industry physical 
capital intensities. 20 To control for the possibility that human capital intensive industries may have 
higher innovation intensity in high human capital intensive countries, we include an interaction 
between industry human capital intensities21 and a country level human capital index.22 The 
estimates of these models are shown in Table 6.  
[Table 6 about here] 
As shown in Table 6, our results from the baseline regression are robust to the inclusion of these 
additional covariates. It appears that in countries with stricter EPLR, innovation intensity was lower 
in industries with higher job reallocation rates.  However, as shown in column 4 this effect does not 
hold when we include both interactions of industry job reallocation rates with EPLR and EPLT in our 
models. The signs of the coefficients of the additional control variables are as expected. We find that 
greater import competition had a positive effect on innovation intensity, while the strictness of 
industry product market regulations was associated with lower innovation intensity.  In terms of the 
country-industry specialisation covariates, we find that industries with high physical capital 
intensities had greater innovation intensity in capital abundant countries. Further, our results 
indicate that high human capital intensive industries had greater innovation intensity in countries 
which had a high human capital index. 
We next examine whether the EPL effect partly captures the effect of other country-level labour 
market institutions which may affect industry job reallocation propensity. We consider the following 
labour market institutions (LMI) measures: (i) union density; (ii) the average tax wedge; (iii) the 
average gross unemployment benefit; (iv) a measure of net unemployment benefit; (v) an index 
which measures the degree of coordination in the wage bargaining process; (vi) an index of wage 
                                                          
20  We use industry data for the US to calculate physical capital intensity at the industry level.   
21  We use industry data for the US to calculate human capital intensity at the industry level.  
22  These data are taken from the OECD database. For more details see Table A1 in the Appendix.  
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bargaining centralization, and (vii) expenditure on active labour market policies as a percentage of 
GDP.  
Table 7 reports the estimates obtained for the overall EPL.  
[Table 7 about here] 
The estimates shown in Table 7 suggest that stricter EPL led to lower innovation intensity in 
industries with higher job reallocation rates, over and above the effect of other labour market 
institutions on innovation intensity. In addition, it appears that the generosity of unemployment 
benefit systems led to lower innovation intensity in industries with higher job reallocation rates, 
while higher co-ordination and higher centralisation of wage setting led to higher innovation 
intensity in the same group of industries. These later results are in line with findings reported in 
Haucap and Wey (2004). Further, it appears that a decrease in the gross unemployment benefit led 
to higher innovation intensity in industries with higher job reallocation rates.   
Table 8 reports the estimates for EPLR and EPLT on innovation intensity.   
[Tables 8 about here] 
While the effect of EPLR on innovation intensity appears insignificant, stricter EPLT led to lower 
innovation intensity in industries with higher job reallocation rates over and above the effect of 
other labour market institutions. Again we find that in industries with higher job reallocation rates, 
the generosity of unemployment benefit systems led to lower innovation intensity while higher co-
ordination and centralisation of wage setting institutions increased the innovation intensity. In 
addition, a reduction of gross unemployment benefits increased innovation intensity in these 
industries.   
Sensitivity Analysis 
We next conduct a number of sensitivity checks. First, we use an alternative measure of EPL which is 
taken from Allard (2005a). This EPL measure uses the OECD methodology and generates an index 
which ranges from 0 and 5. Second, we use a measure of industry layoff propensities as an 
alternative to the job reallocation rates. Finally, we re-estimate our model with additional industry 
controls (see Eq. 2 and Table 6) and exclude one country at a time. 
Our results are robust to these sensitivity checks. Table 9 reports the estimates obtained with an  
alternative EPL measure. This EPL measure is an index for overall strictness of employment 
protection which ranges from 0 to 5 constructed yearly. The data are taken from Allard (2005a).    
[Table 9 about here] 
Table 9 shows that our main results are robust to using this alternative EPL measure.  We find that 
stricter EPL led to lower innovation intensity in industries with higher job reallocation rates over and 
above the effect of other industry covariates and labour market institutions. In industries with higher 
job reallocation rates, the generosity of unemployment benefits led to lower innovation intensity, 
while higher wage centralisation led to higher innovation intensity. An increased tax wedge and 
lower gross unemployment benefits led to higher innovation intensity in industries with higher job 
reallocation rates.      
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Tables 10 and 11 report the estimates obtained with an alternative measure of industry layoff 
propensities. We use the US industry layoff rates taken from Bassanini et al. (2009). The layoff rate 
for each industry in a particular year is defined as the percentage ratio between annual recorded 
layoffs and wage and salary employment in that year.     
[Tables 10 and 11] 
As shown in Table 10, our main empirical findings are robust to using this alternative measure of 
industry layoff rates. Stricter EPL led to lower innovation intensity in industries with higher job layoff 
propensities. In these industries, a higher tax wedge led to higher innovation intensity while higher 
unemployment benefits led to lower innovation intensity.  
Finally, Table 11 shows that while stricter EPLT led to lower innovation intensity in industries with 
higher layoff rates, the effect of stricter EPLR appears insignificant with the exception of the models 
which control for the effect of wage co-ordination and labour market activation measures. In these 
latter two cases, the evidence suggests that stricter EPLR led to lower innovation intensity in 
industries with higher layoff rates. Again we find that in industries with higher layoff rates, a higher 
tax wedge led to higher innovation intensity while the generosity of the unemployment benefit led 
to lower innovation intensity.    
As a final robustness check, we re-estimate the augmented model (Eq. 2) which includes the EPL and 
job reallocation interaction excluding one country from the sample at a time. The estimated 
coefficient of the 𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 interaction for each sample with one country excluded at a time are 
presented in Figure 8. The 95% confidence interval bounds for each coefficient are denoted by ci_u 
and ci_l in Figure 8. The country excluded from the estimated sample is shown along the x-axis. 
Figure 8 shows that the findings regarding the  𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 interaction are unlikely to be driven by 
a set of observations specific to one country. The interaction term remains stable and significant for 
each alternative sample, although the estimated interaction is notably larger when the UK is 
excluded from the sample.  
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
7. Conclusions 
We analysed the link between the strictness of employment protection legislation and innovation 
intensity in OECD countries. We considered two channels through which employment protection 
impacts on innovation: human capital investment and adjustment costs to industry-specific shocks. 
We used a panel of annual data over the period 1990-1999 and estimated difference-in-difference 
models to explain the variation of innovation intensity between industries within countries.   
Our estimates indicate that stricter employment protection legislation led to significantly lower 
innovation intensity in industries with higher job reallocation rates or higher layoff propensities, 
where EPL are likely to be more binding. Further, in industries with higher job reallocation rates or 
higher layoff propensities, the strictness of employment regulations on the use of temporary 
contracts had a stronger impact on innovation intensity than the strictness of employment 
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protection for regular contracts. The short-run effect of the EPL on innovation intensity appears 
insignificant in most cases.    
Our findings are robust to additional industry covariates as well as to other labour market 
institutions that may affect industry innovation intensity and job reallocation propensity. Innovation 
intensity was higher in industries with a higher import competition and in industries with less strict 
product market regulations. Further, in countries more abundant in human capital, we found that 
innovation intensity was higher in industries with higher human capital intensities. In countries 
abundant in physical capital, innovation intensity was found to be higher in industries intensive in 
physical capital. These results are in line with Saint-Paul (1997, 2002) and Griffith and Macartney 
(2010).   
Furthermore, we find that the generosity of unemployment benefit systems led to significantly lower 
innovation intensity in industries with higher job reallocation rates, while higher co-ordination and 
higher centralisation of wage setting led to significantly higher innovation intensity in the same 
group of industries. These later results are in line with findings reported by Haucap and Wey (2004). 
It also appears that a decrease in the gross unemployment benefit led to significantly higher 
innovation intensity in industries with higher job reallocation rates.   
In addition, our sensitivity analysis indicates that our results are not driven by the specific measures 
of employment protection and industry layoff propensity that we use or by any country in our 
sample.  Our results support previous evidence found by Griffith and Macartney (2010) and Barbosa 
and Faria (2011).  
This evidence suggests three policy implications. First, relaxing employment protection legislation 
would be beneficial for innovation intensity, particularly in industries with a high propensity to 
adjust to industry-specific technological and market driven factors through job reallocation. Second, 
relaxing the use of temporary contracts in industries with higher job reallocation rates or higher 
layoff propensities is likely to pay off more in terms of innovation intensity than reforming the 
employment protection legislation for regular contracts. Third, labour market reforms, such as 
relaxing employment protection regulations, are likely to affect significantly innovation performance 
in the long-run only while their effect in the short-run is unlikely to be sizeable.   
Taken together our evidence suggests that, to the extent that enhancing efficiency is desirable, 
targeted labour market deregulation, such as relaxing the use of temporary contracts in industries 
with higher job reallocation rates or higher layoff propensities, could be advocated on the grounds 
of fostering innovation in the long-run.   
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Figure 1:  Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) Strictness, OECD Countries 
 
Notes: Employment Protection Legislation is a composite index measuring the strictness of regulation and dismissal for 
regular and temporary contracts on a scale from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions). Where data is unavailable for 
the years 1985 or 2008, the closest year available is used. The countries covered are the following: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States.  
Source: OECD (www.oecd.org/employment/protection). 
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Figure 2:  Employment Protection Legislation Strictness for Regular Contracts (EPLR), 
  OECD Countries 
 
Notes: Employment Protection Legislation for Regular Contracts is a sub-indicator measuring the strictness of dismissal of 
employees on regular contracts. This is calculated on a scale from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions) as a 
weighted sum of (i) procedural inconveniences of individual dismissals on regular contracts; (ii) notice and severance pay 
for no-fault individual dismissal; (iii) the difficulty of dismissal. Where data is unavailable for the years 1985 or 2008, the 
closest year available is used. The countries covered are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.  
Source: OECD (www.oecd.org/employment/protection). 
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Figure 3: Employment Protection Legislation Strictness for Temporary Contracts (EPLT),    
  OECD Countries 
 
Notes: Employment Protection Legislation for Temporary contracts is a sub-indicator measuring the strictness of regulation 
on temporary contracts. This is calculated on a scale from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions) as a weighted sum of 
the strictness of regulation for (i) temporary work agency employment; and (ii) fixed term contracts. Where data is 
unavailable for the years 1985 or 2008, the closest year available is used. The countries covered are the following: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.  
Source: OECD (www.oecd.org/employment/protection). 
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Figure 4:  Innovation Intensity, OECD Countries 
 
Notes: Patent Intensity is defined as the total patents for the period 1989-1999 per total hours worked by employees 
(millions) for the period 1989-1999. Patents are counted fractionally, that is if a patent is assigned k codes, it counts 1/k for 
each industry. The countries covered are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovak Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
United States. 
Source: EUKLEMS Database (http://www.euklems.net/). 
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Figure 5:  Average Strictness of EPL and Average Innovation Intensity, 1989-1999 
 
Notes: Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) is a composite index measuring the strictness of regulation and dismissal 
for regular and temporary contracts on a scale from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions). The average EPL is 
computed for each country over the years 1989-1999. Innovation intensity (INNO) is defined as the total patents for the 
period 1989-1999 per total hours worked by employees (millions) for the period 1989-1999. Patents are counted 
fractionally, that is if a patent is assigned k codes, it counts 1/k for each industry. 
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Source: OECD (www.oecd.org/employment/protection) and EUKLEMS Database (http://www.euklems.net/). 
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Figure 6:  Average Strictness of EPLR and Average Innovation Intensity, 1989-1999 
 
 
Notes: Employment Protection Legislation for Regular Contracts (EPLR) is a sub-indicator measuring the dismissal of 
employees on regular contracts. This is calculated on a scale from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions) as a 
weighted sum of i) procedural inconveniences of individual dismissals on regular contracts, ii) notice and severance pay for 
no-fault individual dismissal and iii) the difficulty of dismissal. The average EPLR is computed for each country over the 
years 1989-1999. Innovation intensity (INNO) is defined as the total patents for the period 1989-1999 per the total 
employee hours (millions) for the period 1989-1999. Patents are counted fractionally, that is if a patent is assigned k codes, 
it counts 1/k for each industry. 
 
Country  Codes are shown below: 
Country 
 
Code Country 
 
Code Country 
 
Code 
Australia 
 
AS France 
 
FR Korea 
 
KO 
Austria 
 
AT Germany 
 
DE Netherlands NL 
Belgium 
 
BE Greece 
 
EL Portugal 
 
PT 
Canada 
 
CA Ireland 
 
IE Spain 
 
ES 
Denmark 
 
DK Italy 
 
IT Sweden 
 
SE 
Finland 
 
FI Japan 
 
JP United Kingdom UK 
      
United States US 
Source: OECD (www.oecd.org/employment/protection) and EUKLEMS (http://www.euklems.net/). 
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Figure 7:  Average Strictness of EPLT and Average Innovation Intensity, 1989-1999 
 
Notes: Employment Protection Legislation for Temporary Contracts (EPLT) is a sub-indicator measuring the strictness of 
regulation on temporary contracts. This is calculated on a scale from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions) as a 
weighted sum of the strictness of regulation for i) temporary work agency employment and ii) fixed term contracts. The 
average EPLT is computed for each country over the years 1989-1999. Innovation intensity (INNO) is defined as the total 
patents for the period 1989-1999 per total hours worked by employees (millions) for the period 1989-1999. Patents are 
counted fractionally, that is if a patent is assigned k codes, it counts 1/k for each sector. 
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Source: OECD (www.oecd.org/employment/protection) and EUKLEMS (http://www.euklems.net/). 
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Figure 8:  The Effect of EPL on Innovation Intensity Excluding One Country at a Time    
 
Notes: The estimates are obtained with the augmented model (Eq. 2). The countries excluded are shown along   
the x axis.  
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics of EPL Strictness, OECD Countries,   1985-2008 
Country 
Average 
EPL 
EPL 
Change 
Average 
EPLR 
EPLR 
Change 
Average 
EPLT 
EPLT 
Change 
United States 0.21 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.25 0.00 
United Kingdom 0.65 0.15 1.01 0.17 0.29 0.13 
Canada 0.75 0.00 1.25 0.00 0.25 0.00 
Ireland 0.98 0.18 1.60 0.00 0.35 0.38 
Australia 1.07 0.21 1.26 0.42 0.88 0.00 
Switzerland 1.14 0.00 1.16 0.00 1.13 0.00 
New Zealand 1.15 0.54 1.51 0.21 0.79 0.87 
Hungary 1.36 0.38 1.92 0.00 0.81 0.75 
Poland 1.53 0.50 2.06 0.00 1.01 1.00 
Slovak Republic 1.63 -0.36 2.42 0.03 0.85 -0.75 
Japan 1.64 -0.41 1.87 0.00 1.42 -0.81 
Denmark 1.88 -0.90 1.65 -0.05 2.11 -1.75 
Czech Republic 1.93 0.06 3.28 -0.26 0.60 0.38 
Finland 2.14 -0.37 2.41 -0.62 1.87 -0.13 
Austria 2.14 -0.28 2.78 -0.55 1.50 0.00 
Korea 2.32 -0.84 2.73 -0.86 1.91 -0.81 
Netherlands 2.47 -0.78 3.05 -0.36 1.88 -1.19 
Belgium 2.66 -0.97 1.70 0.05 3.63 -2.00 
Sweden 2.68 -1.62 2.87 -0.04 2.49 -3.20 
Germany 2.68 -1.05 2.71 0.42 2.65 -2.50 
Norway 2.75 -0.21 2.25 0.00 3.24 -0.41 
Italy 2.88 -1.68 1.77 0.00 3.99 -3.38 
France 2.95 0.25 2.39 -0.06 3.52 0.57 
Mexico 3.13 0.00 2.25 0.00 4.00 0.00 
Spain 3.30 -0.84 3.07 -1.42 3.52 -0.25 
Greece 3.32 -0.83 2.30 -0.05 4.35 -1.62 
Portugal 3.74 -1.31 4.42 -1.37 3.06 -1.25 
Turkey 3.74 -0.04 2.60 -0.08 4.88 0.00 
Notes: EPL = Employment Protection Legislation Index; EPLR= Employment Protection Legislation for Regular Contracts 
Index; EPLT= Employment Protection Legislation for Temporary Contracts Index. 
Source: OECD (www.oecd.org/employment/protection). 
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Table 2:  Summary Statistics of Innovation Intensity, OECD Countries, 1989-1999 
  
Patent Intensity 
Country 
 
Average Patent Intensity  
1989-1999 
Change in Patent Intensity  
1989-1999 
Portugal 
 
0.00 0.76 
Greece 
 
0.02 1.37 
Spain 
 
0.05 0.23 
Ireland 
 
0.20 0.28 
Korea 
 
0.20 2.22 
Italy 
 
0.21 0.32 
Australia 
 
0.33 0.58 
Austria 
 
0.39 0.56 
United Kingdom 0.43 0.45 
Denmark 
 
0.52 1.06 
Belgium 
 
0.53 0.81 
France 
 
0.62 0.38 
Germany 
 
0.72 0.59 
Netherlands 0.80 0.16 
Canada 
 
0.90 0.47 
Finland 
 
0.98 0.85 
Sweden 
 
0.99 0.76 
Japan 
 
1.17 0.46 
United States 1.87 0.47 
Notes: Average Patent Intensity is defined as the total patents for the period 1989-1999 per total hours worked by 
employees (millions) for the period 1989-1999. Patents are counted fractionally, that is if a patent is assigned k codes, it 
counts 1/k for each sector. The change in patent intensity is calculated as the natural logarithm of the patent intensity in 
1999 per patent intensity in 1989.  
Source: EUKLEMS Database,  http://www.euklems.net/. 
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Table 3:  Spearman Rank Correlation for Pairs of Two Periods between 1990 and 2003, 
  27 Industries  
  
1990-
1991 
1992-
1993 
1994-
1995 
1996-
1997 
1998-
1999 
2000-
2001 
2002-
2003 
1992-1993 0.90             
1994-1995 0.87 0.87       
1996-1997 0.87 0.95 0.89      
1998-1999 0.61 0.71 0.74 0.76     
2000-2001 0.59 0.63 0.74 0.67 0.80    
2002-2003 0.83 0.82 0.87 0.85 0.75 0.85   
2004 0.73 0.73 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.71 0.86 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the EU KLEMS Database. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Industry Job Reallocation Rates, Layoff Rates, Human and Physical Capital Intensity 
Industry Description Code  𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠  𝑙𝑟𝑢𝑠  ℎ𝑐𝑢𝑠  𝑘𝑦𝑢𝑠 
Food Products, Beverages And Tobacco 15-16 0.15 2.83 0.74 0.22 
Textiles, Textile Products, Leather And Footwear 17-19 0.17 6.58 0.66 0.07 
Chemicals And Chemical Products 24 0.14 3.09 0.79 0.32 
Rubber And Plastics Products 25 0.13 4.88 0.79 0.10 
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products  26 0.17 4.85 0.79 0.06 
Basic Metals And Fabricated Metal Products 27-28 0.17 5.64 0.79 0.22 
Machinery, Nec 29 0.13 5.42 0.84 0.18 
Electrical And Optical Equipment  30-33 0.18 8.12 0.80 0.44 
Other Instruments 34-35 0.19 4.53 0.82 0.29 
Manufacturing Nec; Recycling 36-37 0.26 5.95 0.74 0.08 
Source: Bassanini et al. (2009) and own calculations based on data from the EU KLEMS Database. 
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Tables 5: Innovation Intensity and Employment Protection Legislation, Baseline Model 
 
EPL EPLR EPLT EPLR, EPLT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 -0.343*** 
   
 
(0.106) 
   𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡  1.108 
   
 
(1.586) 
   𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 
 
-0.177 
 
-0.018 
  
(0.123) 
 
(0.131) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 
 
-1.912 
 
-2.455 
  
(2.319) 
 
(2.309) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 
  
-0.250*** -0.252*** 
   
(0.068) (0.072) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 
  
1.112 1.272 
   
(0.921) (0.934) 
Country * Time Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Industry * Time Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Country-Industry Groups 180 180 180 180 
Observations 1620 1620 1620 1620 
Adjusted R2 0.747 0.746 0.748 0.747 
Economic Significance of EPL Job Reallocation 
Interaction 
    25th- 75th percentile -1.72 -0.89 -1.91 
 10th - 90th percentile -9.21 -3.26 -10.99 
 Notes: The estimates were obtained with an OLS estimator. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *,**,*** 
denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Detailed definitions of variables and data sources are given in 
Table A1. 
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Table 6: Innovation Intensity and Employment Protection Legislation: Additional Controls 
 
EPL EPLR EPLT EPLR, EPLT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 -0.595*** 
   
 
(0.113) 
   𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡  0.251 
   
 
(1.541) 
   𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 
 
-0.312** 
 
-0.004 
  
(0.144) 
 
(0.152) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 
 
-0.495 
 
-0.595 
  
(2.546) 
 
(2.363) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 
  
-0.424*** -0.425*** 
   
(0.069) (0.073) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 
  
0.122 0.142 
   
(0.885) (0.889) 
𝑘𝑦𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) hc𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑑𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 0.011 0.010 0.021 0.021 
 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) 
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 0.192*** 0.184*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 
 
(0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) 
𝑝𝑚𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 -1.290*** -1.172*** -1.379*** -1.381*** 
 
(0.341) (0.359) (0.340) (0.347) 
Country * Time Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Industry * Time Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Country-Industry Groups 170 170 170 170 
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 
Adjusted R2 0.809 0.806 0.810 0.810 
Notes: The estimates were obtained with an OLS estimator. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *,**,*** 
denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Detailed definitions of variables and data sources are given in 
Table A1. 
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Table 7: Innovation Intensity and EPL (Overall EPL Index):  Controls for Labour Market Institutions  
 
Union 
Density  
Tax 
Wedge 
Gross 
Unempl. 
Benefit 
Net Unempl. 
Benefit  
Wage 
Coordina-
tion 
Wage 
Centralisa-
tion 
Labour  
Market  
Activation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 -0.569*** -0.511*** -0.370*** -0.543*** -0.692*** -0.722*** -0.480*** 
 
(0.154) (0.159) (0.132) (0.128) (0.142) (0.142) (0.146) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡  0.707 0.764 0.258 0.427 0.414 -1.017 0.667 
 
(1.517) (1.594) (1.495) (1.530) (1.429) (1.503) (1.659) 
𝑘𝑦𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) hc𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑑𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 0.092*** 0.074*** 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.034 0.022 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 0.327*** 0.342*** 0.162*** 0.164*** 0.168*** 0.170*** 0.152*** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.049) 
𝑝𝑚𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 -0.697 -0.636 -0.699 -0.658 -0.668 -0.459 -1.007 
 
(0.663) (0.683) (0.642) (0.646) (0.663) (0.650) (0.741) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 0.004 0.016 -0.034*** -0.025* 0.328** 0.408*** -0.183 
 
(0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.137) (0.144) (0.200) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡  10.526 0.016* -1.822*** 0.199 -2.380 6.065 0.587 
 
(12.569) (0.061) (0.513) (0.552) (3.391) (4.881) (1.105) 
Country *Time Fixed 
Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry *Time Fixed 
Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country-Industry Groups 150 140 160 160 160 160 150 
Observations 1350 1260 1440 1440 1440 1440 1350 
Adjusted R2 0.826 0.808 0.812 0.811 0.812 0.812 0.808 
 
Notes: The estimates were obtained with an OLS estimator. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *,**,*** 
denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Detailed definitions of variables and data sources are given in 
Table A1. 
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Table 8:  Innovation Intensity and Employment Protection (EPLR and EPLT): Controls for Labour 
Market Institutions  
  
Union 
Density  
Tax 
Wedge 
Gross 
Unempl. 
Benefit  
Net 
Unempl. 
Benefit   
Wage 
Coordina-
tion 
Wage 
Centralisa
-tion 
Labour 
Market 
Activation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 0.141 - 0.286* 0.091 -0.006 -0.194 -0.315 -0.027 
 
(0.163) (0.172) (0.169) (0.162) (0.171) (0.194) (0.188) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 -0.554 -2.855 -0.610 -0.624 -0.650 -0.635 -0.441 
 
(2.336) (4.440) (2.519) (2.415) (2.355) (2.240) (2.487) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 -0.487*** -0.530*** -0.319*** -0.400*** -0.412*** -0.376*** -0.378*** 
 
(0.085) (0.091) (0.082) (0.077) (0.079) (0.076) (0.119) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 0.221 0.270 0.119 0.200 0.314 -0.500 0.331 
 
(0.834) (0.830) (0.835) (0.880) (0.831) (0.894) (0.951) 
𝑘𝑦𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) hc𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑑𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 0.105*** 0.094*** 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.035 0.028 
 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 0.343*** 0.364*** 0.170*** 0.171*** 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.159*** 
 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) 
𝑝𝑚𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 -0.791 -0.706 -0.756 -0.713 -0.710 -0.477 -1.004 
 
(0.673) (0.685) (0.649) (0.654) (0.672) (0.666) (0.742) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 0.005 0.024* -0.037*** -0.027* 0.301** 0.392** -0.139 
 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.140) (0.165) (0.204) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡  6.532 0.164** -1.392*** 0.275 -1.383 5.833 0.670 
 
(13.233) (0.064) (0.537) (0.532) (3.468) (4.911) (1.113) 
Country * Time 
Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry * Time 
Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country-Industry 
Groups 150 140 160 160 160 160 150 
Observations 1350 1260 1440 1440 1440 1440 1530 
Adjusted R2 0.827 0.827 0.813 0.811 0.812 0.812 0.813 
Notes: The estimates were obtained with an OLS estimator. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *,**,*** 
denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Detailed definitions of variables and data sources are given in 
Table A1. 
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Table 9:  Innovation Intensity and Employment Protection: Alternative EPL Measure 
 
Baseline Model 
Augmented 
Model 
Union 
Density  Tax Wedge 
Gross 
Unempl. 
Benefit  
Net Unempl. 
Benefit  
Wage 
Coordina-
tion 
Wage 
Centralisa-
tion 
Labour Market 
Activation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 -0.318** -0.533*** -0.374** -0.467**  -0.397*** -0.611*** -0.603*** -0.700*** -0.433** 
 
(0.127) (0.142) (0.164) (0.195) (0.148) (0.149) (0.148) (0.149) (0.183) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡  -0.657 -1.229 -1.070 -4.475**  -0.544 -1.610 -1.154 -1.423 -1.157 
 
(1.386) (1.438) (1.527) (2.204) (1.293) (1.444) (1.484) (1.478) (1.455) 
𝑘𝑦𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 
 
0.053*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) hc𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑑𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 
 
0.027 0.096*** 0.079*** 0.026 0.027 0.030 0.034 0.024 
  
(0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 0.166*** 0.325*** 0.345*** 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.167*** 0.169*** 0.151*** 
  
(0.047) (0.034) (0.035) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.049) 
𝑝𝑚𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 
 
-0.822 -0.822 -0.749 -0.759 -0.750 -0.802 -0.620 -1.170 
  
(0.664) (0.661) (0.683) (0.639) (0.647) (0.664) (0.655) (0.740) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 
 
0.002 0.014 -0.041*** -0.035** 0.195 0.342** -0.277 
   
(0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.131) (0.143) (0.200) 
𝑗𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡  
 
-2.242 0.130* -1.903*** 0.256 -4.120 6.166 -0.046 
   
(12.306) (0.066) (0.542) (0.546) (3.621) (4.573) (1.106) 
Country * Time 
Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry * Time 
Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country-Industry 
Groups 160 160 150 140 160 160 160 160 150 
Observations 1440 1440 1350 1260 1440 1440 1440 1440 1350 
Adjusted R2 0.765 0.810 0.825 0.824 0.812 0.810 0.810 0.811 0.807 
Notes: The estimates were obtained with an OLS estimator. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Detailed 
definitions of variables and data sources are given in Table A1.   
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Table 10: Innovation Intensity and EPL: Model Specifications with Industry Layoff Rates 
  Baseline Model 
Augmented 
Model 
Union 
Density  Tax Wedge 
Gross 
Unempl. 
Benefit  
Net Unempl. 
Benefit  
Wage 
Coordination 
Wage 
Centralisation 
Labour 
Market 
Activation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (7) 
𝑙𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.019*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝑙𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡  -0.045 -0.034 -0.017 -0.018 -0.040 -0.040 -0.052 -0.117** -0.021 
 
(0.069) (0.064) (0.063) (0.067) (0.058) (0.059) (0.054) (0.055) (0.067) 
𝑘𝑦𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 
 
0.057*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 
  
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) hc𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 
 
0.019*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑑𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 
 
0.027 0.101*** 0.086*** 0.038* 0.039* 0.044** 0.044** 0.044** 
  
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 
 
0.173*** 0.307*** 0.329*** 0.173*** 0.165*** 0.152*** 0.153*** 0.135*** 
  
(0.045) (0.036) (0.038) (0.050) (0.049) (0.046) (0.048) (0.049) 
𝑝𝑚𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 
 
-1.118*** -1.329** -0.921 -1.094* -1.142* -1.058* -1.103* -1.203* 
  
(0.333) (0.632) (0.658) (0.592) (0.599) (0.623) (0.603) (0.702) 
𝑙𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 
  
-0.000 0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** 0.005 -0.000 0.012 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
𝑙𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡  
  
0.657 0.001 -0.075*** -0.020 -0.165 0.357** -0.008 
   
(0.403) (0.002) (0.022) (0.018) (0.126) (0.156) (0.045) 
Country * Time 
Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry  * Time 
Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country-Industry 
Groups 180 170 150 140 160 160 160 160 150 
Observations 1620 1530 1350 1260 1440 1440 1440 1440 1350 
Adjusted R2 0.752 0.812 0.832 0.830 0.816 0.815 0.814 0.815 0.811 
Notes: The estimates were obtained with an OLS estimator. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Detailed 
definitions of variables and data sources are given in Table A1.  
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Table 11:  Innovation Intensity and Employment Protection (EPLR and EPLT): Model Specifications with Industry Layoff Rates 
  
Baseline 
Model 
Augmented 
Model 
Union 
Density  Tax Wedge 
Gross 
Unempl. 
Benefit 
Net Unempl. 
Benefit 
Wage 
Coordination 
Wage 
Centralisation 
Labour Market 
Activation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
𝑙𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 -0.004 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.006 -0.007 -0.012** -0.009 -0.011* 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
𝑙𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡  -0.014 0.026 0.011 0.004 0.018 0.019 0.023 0.022 0.016 
 
(0.081) (0.074) (0.083) (0.150) (0.078) (0.078) (0.076) (0.078) (0.079) 
𝑙𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.007** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.009** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
𝑙𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡  -0.034 -0.033 -0.018 -0.021 -0.035 -0.036 -0.044 -0.084*** -0.022 
 
(0.042) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.038) 
𝑘𝑦𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐾𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 
 
0.057*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 
  
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) hc𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 
 
0.019*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑑𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 
 
0.028 0.101*** 0.087*** 0.039* 0.040* 0.044** 0.045** 0.043** 
  
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 
 
0.169*** 0.304*** 0.323*** 0.171*** 0.161*** 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.134*** 
  
(0.045) (0.037) (0.038) (0.050) (0.049) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) 
𝑝𝑚𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 
 
-1.096*** -1.328** -0.888 -1.094* -1.140* -1.052* -1.096* -1.223* 
  
(0.330) (0.632) (0.661) (0.593) (0.599) (0.625) (0.605) (0.702) 
𝑙𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 
  
-0.000 0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** 0.005 -0.000 0.011 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) 
𝑙𝑟𝑢𝑠,𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡  
  
0.640 0.002 -0.074*** -0.019 -0.191 0.384** -0.010 
   
(0.408) (0.002) (0.024) (0.018) (0.132) (0.155) (0.045) 
Country * Time Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry  * Time Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country-Industry Groups 180 170 150 140 160 160 160 160 150 
Observations 1620 1530 1350 1260 1440 1440 1440 1440 1350 
Adjusted R2 0.752 0.812 0.832 0.830 0.816 0.815 0.814 0.815 0.820 
  
Notes: The estimates were obtained with an OLS estimator. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Detailed 
definitions of variables and data sources are given in Table A1.  
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 Table A1: Definitions of Variables and Data Sources  
Name Description Source Notes 
Country- Industry Variables    
Innovation Intensity, INNO The natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of 
patents (fractionally assigned) to total hours worked 
in each year. 
EU KLEMS, Linked Data 2008 Release. As noted on website, the patent data is based on 
the NBER database updated by Bronwyn Hall and 
the database refers to patents granted by USPTO 
until 2002. Data is available annually from 1970 
to 1999 for 26 countries. For description of data 
refer to O’Mahony et al (2008). 
http://www.euklems.net/ 
Distance to the Technology  
Frontier, dtf 
The natural logarithm of the industry’s labour 
productivity (i.e. gross value added to total hours 
worked by employees) divided by labour 
productivity in the country-industry with the highest 
value in each year (i.e. industry at the technology 
frontier). 
EU KLEMS, Basic files  
Import Penetration, 
impcomp 
Total imports divided by the sum of gross output 
minus exports plus imports. 
1. OECD STAN Database for Structural Analysis (ISIC 
Rev. 3) 
 
Production data begins in 1990, Export and 
import data only available from 1994 onwards for 
Rep of Korea. The 1998 value for Ireland is an 
extremely large outlier and is replaced with the 
average of its values for 1997 and 1999. 
Product Market Regulation  
Index, pmr 
An index which measures the potential direct and 
indirect costs of product market regulation on 
manufacturing sectors of the economy. 
Nickell (2006) The CEP – OECD Institutions Data Set (1960-
2004). Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. 
 
    
Industry Variables    
Job Reallocation Rates, jr The sum of absolute values of the job destruction 
and job creation rates in each US industry averaged 
over the period 1990-1999. 
EU KLEMS  
Layoff  Rates, lr Average percentage ratio of annual recorded layoffs 
to wage and salary employment in each US industry 
over the period 2001-2003. 
Data are taken from Bassanini et al. (2009). The variable is 
constructed based on data from a number of sources; CPS 
Displaced Workers Supplement, EU KLEMS. 
 
    
Physical Capital Intensity, ky Average real fixed capital assets as a share of real 
gross value added in each US industry over the 
period 1990-1999. 
EU KLEMS  
Human Capital Intensity, hc Average share of hours worked by high and medium 
skilled employees per total hours worked in each US 
industry over the period 1990-1999. 
EU KLEMS  
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Table A1 (continued):  Definitions of Variables and Data Sources 
Name Description Source Notes 
Country Level 
Variables 
   
Employment 
Protection 
Variables: Overall 
EPL, 
Regular EPLR, 
Temporary EPLT 
Indicators which measure the strictness of employment 
protection legislation for overall, regular and temporary 
employment. Variables evaluate the strictness of 
employment protection on a scale of 0 to 6.  
OECD (2010), "Employment Protection Legislation: Strictness of 
employment protection legislation: collective dismissals", OECD 
Employment and Labour Market Statistics (database). 
 
EPL alternative Indicator which measure the strictness of employment 
protection legislation. The series uses the OECD 
methodology and ranges from 0 to 5. 
Nickell (2006), The CEP – OECD Institutions Data Set (1960-2004). 
Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. Original Source: Allard 
(2005a). 
 
 
Union density Number of workers covered by collective agreements 
normalised by employment 
Nickell (2006), The CEP – OECD Institutions Data Set (1960-2004). 
Centre for Economic Performance, LSE 
 
This series was constructed as an interpolation of 
both data series collected by Ochel (2001) and union 
coverage series collected by OECD (2004). We 
interpolated the series differently to the series in  
CEP – OECD Institutions Data Set. i.e. Data is 
available periodically, our data is interpolated yearly 
between points of the average of two series, but 
unlike the CEP-OECD interpolated series when the 
observation of either series is missing we use the 
previous observation to calculate the average before 
interpolating. Data not available for Ireland and 
Greece in dataset. 
 
Tax Wedge Tax Wedge is equal to the sum of the employment tax rate, 
the direct tax rate and the indirect tax rate. 
Nickell (2006), The CEP – OECD Institutions Data Set (1960-2004). 
Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. 
 
Data not available for Australia, Ireland and Greece 
in dataset. 
Gross 
Unemployment 
Benefit  
Benefit Duration is defined as the average unemployment 
benefit across the first five years of unemployment for three 
family situations and two money levels taken from 
www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives and interpolated. 
Nickell (2006), The CEP – OECD Institutions Data Set (1960-2004). 
Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. Original Source: OECD 
 
Complete data series not available for Ireland and 
Greece in dataset. 
Net Unemployment  
Benefit  
An alternative indicator for unemployment benefits which 
combines the amount of the subsidy with their tax 
treatment, their duration and the conditions that must be 
met in order to collect them. 
Nickell (2006), The CEP – OECD Institutions Data Set (1960-2004). 
Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. Original Source: Allard (2005b) 
 
Data not available for Greece in dataset. 
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Table A1 (continued):  Definitions of Variables and Data Sources 
Name Description Source Notes 
Wage Coordination Index of bargaining coordination which ranges from 1 
to 5. The series is increasing in the degree of 
coordination in the bargaining process on the 
employers’ as well as the unions’ side. 
Nickell (2006), The CEP – OECD Institutions Data Set (1960-2004). Centre for 
Economic Performance, LSE, Original Source: OECD (2004), Table 3.5 
 
Data not available for Greece in 
dataset. 
    
Wage Centralisation Index of bargaining centralisation which ranges from 
1 to 5. The series is increasing in the degree of 
centralization. 
Nickell (2006), The CEP – OECD Institutions Data Set (1960-2004). Centre for 
Economic Performance, LSE. Original Source: OECD (2004), Table 3.5 
 
Data not available for Greece in 
dataset. 
Labour Market Activation 
Polices 
Expenditure on Active Labour Market Policies as a 
percentage of GDP 
Nickell (2006), The CEP – OECD Institutions Data Set (1960-2004). Centre for 
Economic Performance, LSE.  Data for 1980, 1989, 1993 and 1998 taken from 
OECD (2001), Table 1.5 and interpolated. Original Source: OECD (2001),   
Complete data series not available 
for  Italy, Greece in dataset.  
    
Physical Capital to GDP Ratio, 
KY 
Variable is defined as the ratio of physical capital 
stock to GDP. Both variables are expressed at 
constant prices. 
OECD (2012), "OECD Economic Outlook No. 91", OECD Economic Outlook: 
Statistics and Projections (database)  
We replaced data for Germany in 
1990 with 1991 value. Also for 
Greece, missing data from 1990-
1993 is replaced with its 1994 value. 
Human Capital Index, HC Country level Human Capital Index. OECD (2012), "OECD Economic Outlook No. 91", OECD Economic Outlook: 
Statistics and Projections (database) To access the Economic Outlook data 
select Economic Indicators, then Outlook version, followed by Supply Block. 
We replaced data for Germany in 
1990 with 1991 value. Also missing 
data from 1990-1993 is replaced 
with its 1994 value. 
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Table A2:  Summary Statistics of the Explanatory Variables, 1991-1999 
Variable Name Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Ln Patent Intensity 1620 0.35 0.39 0.00 1.62 
Ln Distance to Technological Frontier 1620 -0.82 0.6 -2.47 0.00 
Import Competition 1530 0.47 0.32 0.04 1.46 
Industry Regulation Impact Index 1530 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.2 
Union density  135 74.2 22.41 19.80 98.50 
Δ Union density  135 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.01 
Tax wedge 135 54.0 11.64 33.40 85.60 
Δ Tax wedge 135 0.51 2.50 -9.74 7.74 
Gross Unemployment Benefit  144 31.3 12.66 2.50 64.90 
Δ Gross Unemploymnet Benefit  144 0.02 0.13 -0.14 1.35 
Net Unemployment Benefit  144 15.6 8.37 0.80 42.10 
Δ Net Unemployment Benefit  144 0.00 0.18 -0.91 1.35 
Wage Coordination 144 3.27 1.17 1.00 5.00 
Δ Wage Coordination 144 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.29 
Wage Centralisation 144 2.65 1.11 1.00 5.00 
Δ Wage Centralisation 144 0.00 0.03 -0.41 0.00 
Labour Market Activation Policy Expenditure 135 1.07 0.62 0.09 2.97 
Δ Labour Market Activation Policy Expenditure 135 0.01 0.09 -0.20 0.51 
Human Capital Index 162 3.12 0.45 1.92 3.74 
EPL 162 2.31 0.99 0.60 3.85 
EPR 162 2.28 0.86 0.95 4.33 
EPT 162 2.36 1.50 0.25 5.38 
ΔEPL 162 -0.02 0.07 -0.38 0.01 
ΔEPR 162 0.00 0.04 -0.31 0.04 
ΔEPT 162 -0.03 0.13 -0.69 0.00 
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